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INTRODUCTION
The last five years have witnessed explosive growth in the use of
online social-networking services.' These services, commonly known
as social networks, provide people with a flexible medium through
t B.S., University of California, Berkeley, Business Administration, 2007; J.D. Candi-
date, Cornell Law School, 2012; Symposium Editor & Legal Workshop Editor, Cornell Law
Review, Volume 97. 1 wish to thank Professor Hillman for his advice and encouragement
while writing this Note. I also would like to thank the members of the Cornell Law Review
for their invaluable editing, especially Brian Hogue, Gary Finley, Meredith Carpenter, Mil-
son Yu, and the publication's invaluable assistant Susan Pado. Finally, I would like to thank
David Chan for sharing his technical expertise.
1 Jenise Uehara Henrikson, The Growth of Social Media: An Infographic (Aug. 30, 2011),
SEARCH ENGINE J., http://www.searchenginejournal.com/the-growth-of-social-media-an-
infographic/32788/.
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which to communicate and interact with others. 2 People and busi-
nesses alike have discovered a plethora of ways in which to capitalize
on this flexibility. 3 For example, many college students use social net-
works to organize events and share pictures,4 some musicians use so-
cial networks to market and promote their albums, 5 and several
businesses use social networks as public-relations tools. 6 Moreover, so-
cial networks have played prominent roles in both orchestrating 7 and
combating revolutions and public protests. 8
Due in part to the high transaction costs involved in negotiating
separate contracts with every customer, most Internet services, includ-
ing social networks, rely on standard-form, electronic contracts. 9
These standard-form contracts impose a fixed set of contractual terms
upon each customer. 10 Social network providers prepare all of the
terms in these contracts, and potential consumers must either accept
the social network's contract as a whole or abstain from using the so-
cial network." The consumers themselves have no opportunity to
bargain or to negotiate over the terms of the contract. 12
However, some vendors-social networks in particular-have dis-
covered that standard-form contracts are ill equipped to accommo-
date the diverse interests and desires of their customers. Specifically,
standard-form contracts are ill suited for situations in which some cus-
tomers have interests that are mutually exclusive of other customers'
2 See Ian Collins, 5 Common Uses for Social Networking and the Effect on Your Target Audi-
ence (Feb. 2010), BLOGUSSION, http://www.blogussion.com/social-media/uses-social-
networking.
3 See, e.g., Tamar Weinberg, How to Use Facebook for Business and Marketing (May 5,
2010), TECHIPEDIA, http://www.techipedia.com/2010/how-to-use-facebook-for-business-
and-marketing/.
4 See Mark Sullivan, Is Facebook the New MySpace? (July 24, 2007), PCWoRLD, http://
www.pcworld.com/article/ 1 34635/isfacebook the new.myspace.html.
5 See, e.g., Madonna's Facebook Profile, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ma-
donna (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
6 See, e.g., BP America's Facebook Profile, FACEROOK, http://www.facebook.com/BP
America (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
7 See, e.g., Catharine Smith, Egypt's Facebook Revolution: Wael Ghonim Thanks the Social
Network, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/02/11 /egypt-facebook-revolution-wael-ghonim_n_822078.html.
8 See Brianna Lee, Evgeny Morozov on the Era of Cyber-Pragmatism, NEED TO KNOW ON
PBS (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/evgeny-
morozov-on-the-era-of-cyber-pragmatism/7592/.
9 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 429, 467-68 (2002).
10 See Wayne Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power 24-26
(Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1003&context=wayne.barnes.
11 See id. at 26.
12 See AEB & Assocs. Design Grp. v. Tonka Corp., 835 F. Supp. 724, 732 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
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interests.1 3 For example, consider a situation in which Customer A
desires "X" while Customer B desires "Y' from the same vendor.
Neither Customer A nor Customer B can have both X and Y. If both
customers could separately negotiate with the vendor, Customer A
would simply contract for X and Customer B would contract for Y.
However, because the vendor uses a standard-form contract for all of
its sales, the vendor must either strike a balance between X and Y or
offer only one of the two. This result will be undesirable to at least
one of the users, if not both. Moreover, this result is also undesirable
for the vendor, as it is not able to capitalize on its customers' unique
interests.
This Note examines the development of more flexible standard-
form contracts in the social network context and proposes the use of
an interactive contract to address the problem of standard-form con-
tracts' inability to accommodate mutually exclusive interests. An in-
teractive contract is similar to a standard-form contract in all respects
except that, with respect to certain terms, it contains several prewrit-
ten provisions, and the consumer has the ability to choose between
those prewritten provisions.
As a basic example, imagine a data storage company that owns
data-processing centers throughout the United States (such as
Dropbox14). Because electronic discovery and data security laws vary
across jurisdictions, different customers might have different prefer-
ences about where the company stores their data. 15 In particular, ju-
risdictional issues may become increasingly important as governments
ramp up their efforts to combat cyber piracy.' 6 Rather than having a
standard-form contract specifying where each customer's uploaded
data is stored, the contract could contain a provision reading, "Data
uploaded by the User will be stored at . .. " The provision then would
have a pull-down menu through which the consumer could select
from the following three options: (1) "at any one or more of the Pro-
13 See generally Mark Zuckerberg, On Facebook, People Own and Control Their Information,
FACEBOOK BLOC (Feb. 16, 2009, 2:09 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=544
34097130 (discussing some of the problems Facebook has in balancing the conflicting
desires of its users).
14 See Where Are My Files Stored?, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/help/7 (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2012).
15 See Rules and Statutes, KROLL ONTRACK, http://www.krollontrack.com/resource-
library/rules-and-statutes/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (listing by state the rules regarding
electronic discovery, computer forensics, and technology in litigation).
16 See Nick Perry, Popular File-Sharing Website Megaupload Shut Down, USA TODAY Uan.
20, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-01-19/megaupload-
feds-shutdown/52678528/1 (explaining that Megaupload's storing of data on leased serv-
ers in Virginia exposed the Hong Kong-based company to prosecution in the United
States). Although Megaupload's prosecution was targeted at the company itself, prosecu-
tors might also target file sharers in later actions. A file sharer's exposure to liability may
depend on the jurisdiction where that file-sharer's data is stored.
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vider's data centers, depending on the Provider's available bandwidth
and storage space," (2) "at any one or more of the Provider's data
centers located in California," or (3) "at any one or more of the Pro-
vider's data centers located in Nevada." If the provider prefers the
first option, it could either charge a fee for customers who want to
select the other two options, or it could couple the other two options
with additional terms that might be more favorable to the provider in
other respects. Furthermore, the provider could set the first option as
the default option, which would take effect if a customer does not
interact with the pull-down menu.
This interactive arrangement allows different customers to better
attain their interests and allows the provider to capitalize on the dif-
fering interests that some customers may have. Moreover, interactive
contracts retain the same economies-of-scale benefits that standard-
form contracts offer because the provider does not have to actively
negotiate with any of its customers.
While the costs of implementing an interactive contract may
seem high, the technology is already available. Social networks cur-
rently use a similar process to create flexible "settings-based con-
tracts."'17 A social network's settings-based contract typically works as
follows. When a user first signs up for a social network, the user is
required to accept the network's terms of service.' 8 At this point, the
user has no control over any of the terms. However, once the user has
created an account, the social network allows the user to specify cer-
tain preferences in the user's account-settings page. 19 For example,
Facebook users can specify whether or not they want Facebook to use
their names in advertisements. 20 These preferences are then incorpo-
rated into the social network's terms of service via an incorporation
clause. 2'
To be sure, social networks' settings-based contracts differ from
interactive contracts in several ways. Most importantly, settings-based
contracts do not allow consumer interaction during the contracting
process itself; instead, consumers can only interact with the terms of
the contract after accepting the contract. Moreover, settings-based
contracts require the existence of some sort of settings page, which
presupposes an ongoing relationship between the consumer and ven-
17 See infra Part III.
18 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (requiring user to
click on the "Sign Up" button to create an account).
19 See, e.g., Privacy, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, www.facebook.com/help/privacy (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2012).
20 See Social Ads, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/fba-whatsthis (last visited Aug.
8, 2012).
21 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 2, http://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms (last updated Apr. 26, 2011).
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dor. Many online transactions, however, do not involve an ongoing
relationship. Nevertheless, this Note argues that the technology used
by social networks to create settings-based contracts can be easily mod-
ified to create interactive contracts, which are more widely applicable
than settings-based contracts and respond better to many of the criti-
cisms levied against standard-form contracts.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I quickly summarizes some
of the problems facing standard-form contracts and provides a brief
overview of social networks. Part II begins the discussion of flexible
contracting by describing how social networks must struggle with bal-
ancing two mutually exclusive interests: data security and data accessi-
bility. Part III first examines how Facebook, one of the most popular
social networks, 22 has developed a flexible settings-based contract to
help balance these interests. It then analyzes some of the strengths
and limitations of Facebook's settings-based contract. Finally, Part IV
introduces the concept of an interactive contract and articulates how
vendors may use interactive contracts to resolve some of the issues
raised in Part III.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Standard-Form Contracts
The majority of online transactions are governed by standard-
form contracts. 2 3 A standard-form contract, sometimes referred to as
a contract of adhesion, "is a contract whose terms are dictated by one
contracting party to another who has no voice in its formulation."24
Standard-form contracts also govern a plethora of activities that a rea-
sonable person might not consider to be transactional in nature. For
example, the mere act of visiting YouTube constitutes an acceptance
of YouTube's terms of service agreement. 25
Standard-form contracts pose two salient enforceability problems.
First, there is a legitimate question as to whether a consumer has as-
sented to the terms of an electronic standard-form contract. 26 Sec-
22 See LeeAnn Prescott, 54% of US Internet Users on Facebook, 27% on MySpace, VEN-
TUREBEAT (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/02/10/54-of-us-
internet-users-on-facebook-27-on-myspace/.
23 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 466.
24 See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2002) (citing ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, 1-1 CORBIN ON CoNTRACTs § 1.4, at 13 (1993)).
25 See Terms of Service, YouTuBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms.
26 See, e.g., Dawn Davidson, Comment, Click and Commit: What Terms Are Users Bound to
When They Enter Web Sites?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. RaV. 1171, 1178-79 (2000) ("[1]t is uncer-
tain whether there has been a true offer and acceptance [in online user agreements] and
whether a manifestation of assent has occurred."); Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play:
Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405, 408-09
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ond, courts may apply the doctrine of unconscionability, which will
likely result in more careful scrutiny of standard-form contracts. 27
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation is the most influential
case involving the issue of assent in Internet-based contracts. 28 In
Specht, the defendant Netscape Communications Corporation (Net-
scape) offered various freeware programs, including Communicator
and SmartDownload, on its website. 29 If a visitor attempted to install
Communicator, the installation program would display Netscape's
terms of service agreement on the visitor's computer screen. 30 The
installation program would not continue unless the visitor then
clicked a "Yes" button to indicate acceptance of all the terms of the
agreement. 31  In contrast, if a visitor attempted to install
SmartDownload, no terms of service agreement would appear on the
screen. 32 Instead, the only way for visitors to see the SmartDownload
terms of service agreement was to click on a hyperlink that was located
at the bottom of the SmartDownload website. 33 The central issue of
the case was whether the plaintiffs (who had downloaded either Com-
municator, SmartDownload, or both) had assented to Netscape's
terms of service agreements. 34 To resolve the issue, the Court looked
at whether the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the terms of service
agreements. 35
Because the plaintiffs in Specht admitted that they had assented to
the Communicator terms of service agreement,36 the Court focused
on the enforceability of the SmartDownload agreement. 37 Ultimately,
the Court determined that the SmartDownload program did not no-
tify visitors of the existence of a terms of service agreement because a
reasonably prudent person would not have scrolled to the bottom of
the SmartDownlad website before installing the SmartDownload
software. 38
In reaching its decision, the Specht court differentiated between
enforceable "clickwrap" contracts and what has commonly become
(2010) (discussing the idea of the "passive media user" who does not engage in the sorts of
activities that typically signal assent).
27 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 492-93.
28 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Robert Lee Dickens, Finding Common Ground in the
World of Electronic Contracts: The Consistency of Legal Reasoning in Clickwrap Cases, 11 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 379, 385 (2007).
29 306 F.3d at 21.
30 Id. at 21-22.
31 Id. at 22.
32 Id. at 23.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 28-30.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 35.
37 See id. at 28.
38 Id. at 31-32.
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known as "browsewrap" contracts. 39 A clickwrap contract is generally
defined as an electronic agreement that a website automatically
presents to a user and that requires the user to affirmatively click an "I
agree" button to proceed.40 In contrast, a browsewrap contract in-
volves situations in which a vendor places a contract on its website that
purports to bind a visitor whether the visitor actually sees the terms of
the contract. 41 Thus, the distinction that Specht draws between brow-
sewrap and clickwrap agreements is founded upon the concept of
constructive notice. 42
The doctrine of unconscionability, on the other hand, involves a
two-step analysis of the circumstances surrounding the formation of
the contract in question and the fairness of the contract's terms.43 To
invalidate all or part of a contract on unconscionability grounds, a
plaintiff must prove that the contract was both procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable. 44
A contract is procedurally unconscionable if the weaker party had
a lack of meaningful choice.45 In deciding whether a party has a
meaningful choice, courts consider a wide host of factors, including
whether that party could have reasonably obtained similar products or
services from other vendors without submitting to similarly onerous
terms,4 6 and whether the terms comport with the parties' reasonable
expectations. 47
Standard-form contracts are, by their very nature, prone to be
procedurally unconscionable as compared to bargained-for con-
tracts.48 This is because consumers who are presented with standard-
form contracts often have no meaningful choice: they cannot bargain
39 Dickens, supra note 28, at 386-87.
40 Id. at 387; see Specht, 306 F.3d at 22.
41 See Dickens, supra note 28, at 387.
42 See id.; see also Davidson, supra note 26, at 1187 (pointing out that courts impute
knowledge of contractual terms on purchasers in shrinkwrap cases but not in cases involv-
ing online user agreements).
43 See Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
44 See id.
45 See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("[A]n unconscionable agreement is one marked by an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties ...."); Tulowitzki v. Ad. Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960
(Del. 1978) ("[For a contract] to be unfair or unconscionable ... there must be an ab-
sence of meaningful choice . . ").
46 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 794-95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
47 SeeA & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 123-24 (Ct. App. 1982).
48 See, e.g., Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 ("A contract or clause is procedurally uncon-
scionable if it is a contract of adhesion." (citing Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381-82 (Ct. App. 2001))); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc.,
938 P.2d 903, 924 (Cal. 1997) ("In determining whether a contract term is unconscionable,
we first consider whether the contract ... was one of adhesion.").
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with the vendor and likely have few alternative choices because com-
peting vendors often have similar contracts. 49
With respect to substantive unconscionability, courts generally ex-
amine specific terms of the contract. 50 Commentators have described
this aspect of the unconscionability doctrine as a means by which
courts void contract clauses based on terms that they perceive to be
unfair but that they cannot address using more formal policing doc-
trines.5' Generally speaking, courts are likely to find a term substan-
tively unconscionable if the term places an unreasonable burden on
the weaker party.52
B. Social Networks: A Brief History
The term "social network," as used in this Note, refers to all on-
line services that allow users to create and maintain online profiles, to
define relationships with other users, and to interact with other users'
profiles. 53 Social networks first arose in the late 1990s, with services
such as SixDegrees.com that allowed users to create personal profiles
and to browse other friends' profiles. 5 4 Many of these earlier social
networks were designed with a specific use in mind.5 5 For example,
Classmates.com catered to people who wanted to find or contact their
old classmates, and Match.com promoted itself as an online match-
making service. 56 By 2000, however, the development of new social
networking techniques allowed for a much greater level of interaction
between users, and new social networks arose, offering their services
to a much wider audience.57 The discussion that follows will largely
focus on the new generation of social networks, especially Facebook,
which is currently one of the most popular social networks. 58
Social networks are not identical services; the ability to maintain
an online presence and to interact with others online presents a vast
49 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 438-39.
50 Comb, 218 F.Supp. 2d at 1173-74.
51 See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
305 (1975).
52 See id.
53 To the author's knowledge, there is no formal definition for the term "social net-
work." However, this definition comports with many other attempts at defining this term.
See, e.g., Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (Oct. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/
issuel/boyd.ellison.html ("We define social network sites as web-based services that allow
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and trav-
erse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.").
54 See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 53.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See Prescott, supra note 22.
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array of possibilities. Accordingly, individuals and businesses have
found myriad uses for social networks. 59 For example, while many col-
lege students create Facebook profiles merely to share pictures and
banter with friends,60 many businesses create Facebook profiles as a
form of public relations,6 1 and many musicians use Facebook to popu-
larize and sell their music. 62
Because different users create social network accounts for differ-
ent reasons, different groups of users inevitably will want different
things from a social network. For example, some users may want the
freedom to export their social networking data or to access their
profiles through third-party sites. 63 In contrast, other users like pro-
fessional photographers might be concerned with protecting their in-
tellectual property rights over the pictures that they place on their
social network profile. 64
II
COMPETING INTERESTS: DATA ACCESSIBILITY
AND DATA SECURITY
Due to current (and foreseeable) technological limitations facing
data security, a social network can only practicably and effectively se-
cure a person's data to a limited extent without also limiting the acces-
sibility of that data. In the past decade, many social networks have
faced the problems that stem from these competing interests. 65 This
Note uses the term "data" to describe the information that users
upload to and store on social networks including pictures, biographi-
cal information, and credit card numbers.
59 See Collins, supra note 2.
60 See, e.g., Mark Allen Chen's Facebook Profile, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/mark.a.chen (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
61 See, e.g., BP America's Facebook Profile, supra note 6.
62 See, e.g., Madonna's Facebook Profile, supra note 5.
63 See Michael Arrington, Give Us Our Data, Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://techcrunch.com/2010/11/09/give-us-our-data-facebook/ ("For a good two years
we've all been waiting for Facebook to let our data out.").
64 See Jon Stahl, Photos on Facebook: Some Intellectual Property Concerns, JON STAHL'S J.
(Nov. 18, 2007), http://jstahl.org/archives/2007/11/18/photos-on-facebook-some-intel-
lectual-property-concems/. The author does not believe that Facebook's terms of service
agreement actually operates as claimed in this article. Nevertheless, this article highlights
user concerns over the issue of intellectual property rights.
65 See, e.g., Jason Kincaid, Another Security Hole Found on Yelp, Facebook Data Once Again
Put at Risk, TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/05/1/another-
security-hole-found-on-yelp-facebook-data-once-again-put-at-risk/ (discussing Facebook's
decision to prevent users from accessing their Facebook data via Yelp, a third party website,
due to Facebook's inability to secure user data once it leaves the Facebook servers); An-
drew LaVallee, Power. com Suit Against Facebook Is Dismissed, WALL ST.J. DIGITS BLOC (Oct. 23,
2009, 2:56 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/10/23/powercom-suit-against-face
book-is-dismissed/ (discussing a lawsuit against Facebook and Power.com over data secur-
ity and data accessibility).
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A. Data Accessibility
"Data accessibility" refers generally to a social-network user's abil-
ity to (1) access that user's social-network data through third-party
websites, which this Note will refer to as social network portals (SNPs),
(2) export that data to other mediums, and (3) share that data with
others. Data accessibility is particularly important for people who
maintain accounts with multiple social networks. 66
SNPs allow social-network users to access multiple social networks
simultaneously. 67 Thus, SNPs provide a convenience to those who
maintain multiple social-network profiles by allowing those users to
manage and update all of their social-network profiles and to interact
with all of their social-network friends from one central location. 68
However, as will be discussed in the next section, the benefits of SNPs
may come at the cost of data security.
As an initial matter, the following is an extremely simplified ex-
planation of how data is stored and transferred between a social net-
work, its users, and third parties. 69 Imagine that Alice wants to upload
a picture from her computer to her Facebook account, which cur-
rently has zero pictures. Before the upload, the picture resides as data
on Alice's computer. When Alice uploads the picture to Facebook,
she sends a copy of that data over the Internet. Facebook then saves
that data onto its computers (called "servers"). At this point, there are
now two copies of the picture: one on Alice's computer, the other on
Facebook's servers.
When Alice's friend, Bob, wants to view Alice's picture over
Facebook, Bob logs into Facebook and browses Alice's photo album.
Bob's computer then automatically downloads a copy of Alice's pic-
ture and displays that picture on his computer monitor. As a general
matter, Bob's computer will temporarily store his copy of Alice's pic-
ture in a folder known as a cache. As Bob browses to other sites and
views other images, his computer will delete old files in the cache
folder to make room for new files. Through this process, Bob's com-
66 See Chris Hogg, Facebook Follows MySpace Lead, Allowing Members to Export Data to Other
Sites, DIGITAL J. (May 10, 2008), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/254515; Claire
Cain Miller, Power.com: A One-Stop Shop for Social Networkers, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOC (Dec. 1,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/brazilian-social-networking-
start-up-arrives-stateside/.
67 See Miller, supra note 66.
68 See id.
69 See generally DAVID GouiRLu' ET AL., HTTP: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3-21 (2002) (pro-
viding an overview of data transfer over the Internet using HTTP, a common transfer pro-
tocol); Roy FIELDING ET AL., HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL-HTTP/1.1 § 1.4 (June
1999), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-1.4 (providing a similar, but more in-
depth, overview of data transfer over the Internet using HTTP).
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puter will eventually delete Alice's picture (although Bob could always
save the picture to another location to keep it permanently).
Now imagine that Alice maintains both a Facebook account and a
MySpace account and that she wants to access both of these accounts
simultaneously through an SNP. To do this, Alice will first go to the
SNP's website. There, the SNP will ask Alice to input her username
and password (her "login information") for her Facebook account
and for her MySpace account.70 The SNP will then use that login in-
formation to log into Alice's Facebook and MySpace accounts as if it
were Alice. 7 1 Once the SNP logs into Alice's Facebook and MySpace
accounts, it will download the data from the webpages that normally
appear whenever Alice first logs onto Facebook and MySpace. The
SNP will then send all of this data to Alice, allowing Alice to view these
webpages on her browser as if she had visited Facebook and MySpace
directly. 72 If Alice clicks on a particular link to visit a different
webpage (say, Bob's Facebook profile), her computer sends a request
for the SNP to browse that webpage. The SNP will then download
that webpage's data and send it to Alice.
In addition to accessing their social network profiles through
SNPs, some users also want the ability to export their data from one
social-network profile so that they can create accounts at other social
networks without having to manually input that data.7 3 Users often
export data by using some kind of program or script that downloads
information from a user's profile, aggregates that information into a
document (often some sort of spreadsheet), and then saves that docu-
ment onto the user's computer. The user can then upload this docu-
ment to another website or program, and the website or program will
use that document to automatically fill out information. For example,
users might export their friends' contact information from Facebook
and import that information to their email accounts to automatically
create email contact entries for their friends.
70 See, e.g., TAGGED, http://www.tagged.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (allowing
users to log in with their Facebook accounts).
71 See e.g., Miller, supra note 66 ("Once a user enters his or her log-in information for
a social network, [the SNP] accesses the site as if it was the user.").
72 See, e.g., id. ("IT]he [SNP] displays the user's social networking pages without
changing them."). Depending on how the SNP's programming works, the SNP may dis-
play a modified version of these websites. Some SNPs choose to display a social network's
websites, including the social network's advertisements, without modification to avoid po-
tential legal conflicts. Cf id. (noting that SNPs "could potentially irritate" social network-
ing sites by allowing users to interact with those sites without actually visiting them).
73 See Hogg, supra note 66.
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B. Data Security
"Data security" refers to the process of protecting data from unau-
thorized use.74 For example, social-network users might want to pre-
vent strangers from accessing their profile pages to harvest their
contact information. Musicians who stream songs on their social net-
work profiles may want to prevent people from copying or download-
ing the songs. Users who conduct financial transactions over social
networks likely want to secure their financial information.
There are ultimately two approaches to securing data.7 5 The first
approach is to encrypt the data. 76 The second approach is to limit
access to that data.77 In the context of social networking, a practical
implementation of either of these approaches requires that the social
network have control over the medium in which the data resides. As a
result, data security often runs opposite to data accessibility.
1. Data Encryption
Data encryption refers to the process of transforming plain text
into "cipher text" (or "coded text").78 Cipher text is nonsensical and
requires decryption to be understood. 79 For example, the message,
"Meet me at 5," once encoded, may instead read "aielxkl." The aim
of this approach is not to protect a message from interception or un-
authorized access but instead to make the message useless to anyone
but the intended recipients (who can decrypt the message to divine its
meaning). 8° Thus, rather than protecting data from falling into the
wrong hands, data encryption secures data by making the data useless
to anyone who does not possess the means to decrypt it.81
A computer transforms plain text into cipher text according to a
particular set of mathematical algorithms (different encryption meth-
ods use different algorithms).82 A "key" determines the parameters of
the algorithms.8 3 In symmetric-key algorithm systems, the same key
74 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 422 (8th ed. 2004) (defining data protection as "[a ] ny
method of securing information, esp. information stored on a computer, from being ei-
ther physically lost or seen by an unauthorized person").
75 See CHRIS BRENTON, MASTERING NETWORK SECURITY 292 (1999).
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 300. Hashing, a process similar to encryption, uses a one-way algorithm to
translate plain text into an undecipherable string of characters (a "hash value"). See SHON
HARRIS, CISSP ALL-IN-ONE ExAM GUIDE 721-22 (Timothy Green ed., 5th ed. 2010). Unlike
cipher text, however, a hash value is never decrypted. Hashing is often used to secure
passwords and to ensure the integrity of data. See id. at 69. The following discussion relat-
ing to the limitations of encryption also applies to hashing.
79 See SIMSON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY 34 (1995).
80 See BRENTON, supra note 75, at 309.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 300.
83 See id.
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encrypts and decrypts the data.84 In asymmetric-key algorithm sys-
tems, the encryption algorithm uses two mathematically-related keys: a
public key and a private key.8 5 A message encrypted by the public key
can only be decrypted by the private key and vice versa.8 6 Today, most
encryption methods involve the use of well-known encryption algo-
rithms.8 7 Thus, the security of an encryption method depends upon
the secrecy of its key.8 8
With respect to social networks, there are three general ap-
proaches to securing data through encryption.8 9 The first approach is
to establish a system where users encrypt their own data and provide
decryption keys to their friends. 90 Under this approach, the burden
of encryption rests on the user. The social network itself neither en-
crypts nor decrypts the user's data. Instead, the social network merely
receives, stores, and transfers encrypted data. As a result, the user's
data is secure no matter where the data goes.
The second approach to securing data through encryption is
known as network encryption.9 1 This form of encryption protects data
that is in transit to and from a social network.92 When a party (such as
a social-network user) seeks to send data to the social network, that
party encrypts the data. When the social network receives the data,
the social network then immediately decrypts that data. Similarly,
when a party receives information from the social network, the social
network will encrypt the data before sending it and the recipient will
decrypt that data upon receiving it.
84 See GARFINKEL, supra note 79, at 42.
85 See id. at 47-51.
86 See HARRis, supra note 78, at 688.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 672.
89 See generally Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Gov-
ernment Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 392 (2010)
(discussing network and disk encryption, and further subdividing disk encryption into two
categories).
90 Soghoian divides disk encryption into two categories: one in which the service pro-
vider knows the decryption key, and one in which the service provider does not. Id. The
first approach discussed in this Note refers to Soghoian's second category of disk encryp-
tion (one in which the service provider does not know the encryption key). Soghoian's
second category of disk encryption, however, is more accurately categorized as its own
system of encryption. Consider that data flows from the user to the service provider, and
that the service provider then stores the data on its servers. See supra note 77 and accompa-
nying text. If disk encryption is used, it makes little difference whether the service provider
possesses the decryption key; the service provider will still have access to the unencrypted
data at the first stage (when the user sends the data to the service provider). Instead, for
this system of encryption to be effective, users must encrypt their data on their end and
then send that encrypted data to the service provider for storage. See, e.g., Randy Baden et
al., Persona: An Online Social Network with User-Defined Privacy, COMPUTER COMM. REV., Oct.
2009, at 135, 135-37 (delineating one implementation of a full-encryption system).
91 See Soghoian, supra note 89.
92 See id.
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The third approach to securing data is by using disk encryption.93
Under this approach, the social network encrypts all the data that is
stored on its servers. However, all the data that the social network
displays on its users' profiles remains unencrypted-otherwise users
would not be able to view each other's data. This approach protects
data from physical attack, such as the theft of a computer server, but it
does not protect data from a network attack, such as the unauthorized
interception of data that a user sends to a social network.
2. Encryption and Accessibility
The first approach to encryption does not require that a user sac-
rifice data accessibility. However, for reasons that will be discussed
later in this section, social networks have no economic incentive to
adopt this approach. The second and third approaches to encryption
are economically feasible, but they are only applicable to data that is
being sent to and from the social network itself and not to data that
resides on the social network's servers.
The first approach allows users to secure data without impacting
accessibility because the data remains encrypted until it arrives at its
final destination. However, a number of problems render this ap-
proach impractical for social networks. First, and perhaps most im-
portantly, companies do not have an incentive to offer free social-
networking services that use this form of encryption. Social networks
primarily rely upon data mining and targeted advertising to generate
income.9 4 That is, social networks constantly gather demographic in-
formation from their users based on the personal information that
users upload to their profiles.9 5 This information is then either sold
to marketers or used to help deliver targeted advertisements.9 6 In a
full encryption system, however, the social network would be unable
to collect any such information because all of the user's data would be
encrypted and the social network would lack the means to decrypt it.
The social network would therefore be without a means to generate
income from its services. As a result, this type of system would only be
feasible if the social network were to charge its users for its services.
Another problem with the full-encryption approach is that, as
with any encryption system, its effectiveness depends upon the confi-
dentiality of the decryption keys. Given that some social-network
users have upwards of 1,000 friends, ensuring the security of each
friend's key would impose even greater costs upon a social-network
user.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 395-96.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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The second and third approaches to encryption do not encoun-
ter these problems. In both approaches, the social network is able to
decrypt the data and thereby mine it. Furthermore, these approaches
require only a maximum of two sets of keys-one for the user and one
for the social network-meaning that the social network does not
need an expensive key-management system. The network-encryption
approach, however, can only secure data transmitted to and from the
social network. Similarly, the disk-encryption approach only allows a
social network to encrypt data that resides on its own servers or on
servers over which it has control. Thus, both of these approaches run
counter to data accessibility.
3. Limiting Access to Data
In contrast to data encryption, a social network may also secure
data by limiting access to it.97 If one were to analogize securing data
to keeping a confidential diary, encryption would involve writing the
diary in a secret code, while access control would involve locking the
diary in a safe. One generally limits access to data by setting up
software controls that prevent parties from accessing certain files with-
out proper authentication. 98 For example, most social networks re-
quire users to log in with their username and password to access
certain pages. 99
As with the second and third approaches to data encryption, a
social network can only limit access to data that resides on a medium
over which it has control. For example, if a social network seeks to
limit access to a user's profile page, but that profile page is also stored
on a freely accessible, third-party website, then other parties can sim-
ply access the profile page via the third-party website regardless of the
social network's access controls. Thus, this form of data security also
runs counter to the data-accessibility interest.
III
BALANCING ACCESSIBILITY AND SECURITY: FACEBOOK'S
SETTINGS-BASED APPROACH
Many social networks have addressed the competing interests of
data security and accessibility by developing a terms of service contract
that incorporates some sort of "account settings" page.' 0 0 These ac-
count-settings pages give users some measure of control over the se-
97 See HARRIS, supra note 78, at 153-56; see also WILLAM R. CHESWICK ET AL., FIREWALLS
AND INTERNET SECURITY:. REPELLING THE WILY HACKER 173 (2d ed. 2003).
98 See HARRIS, supra note 78, at 166.
99 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 18 (asking for a user's email and password to log in).
100 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy?pm-cmp=
edfooter (last updated Dec. 7, 2010); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 21.
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curity and accessibility of their data. This settings-based approach
allows a social network's users to effectively control the terms of a con-
tract by changing their account settings, thus allowing the social net-
work to cater to each of its users' unique preferences. The following
discussion will focus on Facebook's use of a settings-based contract
because Facebook is one of the most popular social networks and be-
cause Facebook has created one of the more robust settings-based
contracts.
Facebook presents its Terms of Use to a new user via browsewrap
when the user first presses the "Sign Up" button on Facebook's home
page. The Terms of Use consists of seven documents: the Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities, the Privacy Policy, the Facebook Plat-
form Policy, the Payments Terms, the Advertising Guidelines, the Pro-
motions Guidelines, and the Pages Terms.10 1 The first two documents
are binding on all Facebook users. 10 2 The third document is only
binding on third-party services (including SNPs) that access or inte-
grate themselves with Facebook. 10 3 The first three documents to-
gether outline the bulk of Facebook's policy toward data security and
accessibility. The remaining documents deal with more specialized
uses of Facebook's servers and are not discussed in this Note.
Facebook's Statement of Rights places several obligations on its
users to maintain the security of their own accounts. 10 4 Furthermore,
the Statement of Rights provides that Facebook will secure a user's
data in accordance with that user's privacy and application-settings
pages.105
Facebook's Privacy Policy states that it stores user data on a se-
cured server, behind a firewall, and that it encrypts users' credit card
information. 10 6 The privacy policy also indicates that users can con-
trol the accessibility of their data via their privacy-settings page.10 7
101 See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/full_data-use-policy (last
updated Sept. 23, 2011); Facebook Advertising Guidelines, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/ad_guidelines.php (last updated Mar. 20, 2012); Facebook Pages Terms, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/terms-pages.php (last updated Feb. 29, 2012); Facebook Platform
Policies, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, http://developers.facebook.com/policy/ (last updated
Mar. 6, 2012); Payments Terms, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/payments-terms/
(last updated Mar. 27, 2012); Promotions Guidelines, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
promotions-guidelines.php (last updated May 11, 2011); Statement of Rights and Responsibili-
ties, supra note 21.
102 See Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, supra note 100; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,
supra note 21.
103 See Facebook Platform Policies, supra note 101.
104 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 21, 3-4.
105 Id. 2.
106 See Data Use Policy, supra note 101, 8.
107 See Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
about/privacy/your-info-on-fb#controlprofile (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
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Facebook has a separate standard-form contract, the Facebook
Platform Policies, which applies to third-party services-including
both applications and websites-that interact with Facebook. 0 8 The
Platform Policies contract places numerous restrictions on third-party
websites that seek to access a Facebook user's data.109 One of these
restrictions is that a third-party service may not collect or request a
user's Facebook login information or implement any feature that
would have the effect of collecting or requesting a user's login infor-
mation.1 10 Presumably, the purpose of this restriction is to force
third-party websites to use Facebook Connect, an application designed
by Facebook that controls the flow of information between Facebook
and the third-party service.' 1
As discussed above, the Statement of Rights and Privacy Policy
incorporate a user's privacy-settings and application-settings pages."l 2
The privacy-settings page allows a user to control which people have
access to that user's data. 1" 3 Thus, users could set up their privacy
settings such that the public at large could view their list of favorite
movies but only their personal friends could see their photo album." 
4
The application-settings page allows users to link their Facebook
profiles to various other social networks, thereby addressing the SNP
interest.' 15
As demonstrated above, Facebook's incorporation of a user-con-
figurable settings page into its Terms of Use allows for a measure of
contractual flexibility that is otherwise unavailable with most standard-
form contracts. Nevertheless, settings-based contracts do little to ad-
dress the oft-cited criticism that users typically consent to standard-
form contracts without having read those contracts."t 6 Additionally,
settings-based contracts have two significant limitations that render
them impracticable in many other contexts.
108 See Facebook Platform Policies, supra note 101.
109 See id. 1-2.
110 See id. 1.
111 See Dave Morin, Announcing Facebook Connect, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS (May 9, 2008,
12:32 PM), http://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/108.
112 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
113 See Choose Who You Share with, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, http://www.facebook.com/
help/privacy/sharing-choices (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
114 See id.
115 See Linked Accounts, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, http://www.facebook.com/help/
?page=2231408377 1 1535 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012). To be sure, Facebook limits the SNPs
to which a user can link a profile. Power.com, for example, is not one of the available
options. See General Account Settings, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/settings?ref=
mb (log in with a Facebook account; then click on "Linked Accounts") (last visited Aug. 8,
2012).
116 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 434-37 (summarizing some of the com-
mon problems with standard-form contracts).
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The first significant limitation to the use of settings-based con-
tracts is that they require an ongoing relationship between the vendor
and consumer that relates to the transaction at hand.'1 17 Without such
a relationship, it is impracticable to incorporate a user-specific settings
page into the terms of that transaction. 1 8 Many online transactions
do not involve ongoing relationships between vendors and consum-
ers.119 For example, many websites allow consumers to purchase
products without creating a long-term relationship. 120 Other vendors
might encourage consumers to create customer accounts,' 2' but these
accounts do not relate to any specific transaction. 22 For example,
consumers who create an Amazon.com customer account can use
their account-settings page to control whether Amazon.com sends
them promotional offers, but they cannot use that page to separately
customize the terms of each individual purchase. 123
The second limitation is that a settings-based contract is only fea-
sible in situations in which a vendor faces negligible transaction costs
when its consumers change their preferences. Under a settings-based
contract, consumers are free to change their account settings on a
whim. For example, a Facebook user might decide to make a photo
album available to everyone on Monday morning, to make the album
private on Monday evening, and then to share the album with friends
on Tuesday morning. Thus, a settings-based contract can become
very expensive for a vendor to maintain if the vendor must expend
resources to accommodate changes in its users' preferences. It might
be impracticable, for example, for a data-storage company to allow its
117 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See Account Optional, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/uk/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=
xpt/cps/general/OptionalAccount-outside (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (discussing the ad-
vantages of allowing users to purchase goods and services without having to create an ac-
count); see, e.g., Pay Securely Online, NUTMEG HOUSE, http://www.thenutmeghouse.com/
roomsand rates/pay-securely-online -with-paypal-_no-paypal-accountnecessary (last
visited Aug. 8, 2012) (using PayPal's "Account Optional" service to sell room reservations
to customers without prompting customers to create an account).
121 See, e.g., Select Checkout Method, BEST Buy, https://www-ssl.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.
jsp?id=pcat17002&type=page&_requestid=226820 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (encouraging
purchasers to create an account before placing an order).
122 See, e.g., Create a BestBuy.com Account, BEST Buy, https://www-ssl.besthuy.com/site/
olspage.jsp;jsessionid=C9A7F5417DBB15D32A96FEC3D2982BDE.bbolsp-app01-05?id=
pcatl700l&type=page (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (allowing users to sign up for accounts
without requiring any specific purchase).
123 See Conditions of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=hp-551434_conditions?nodeld=508088 (last updated Aug. 19, 2011) ("If
you visit or shop at Amazon.com, you accept these conditions.").
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customers to frequently change their data-storage location
preferences. 24
To be sure, a vendor might implement some system to limit the
frequency in which its consumers can change their account settings.
However, this approach would entail monitoring costs as well and
might substantially increase the complexity of a settings page. Addi-
tionally, savvy users could bypass many frequency controls by simply
setting up multiple accounts with the same vendor.
In addition to its limited applicability, the settings-based contract
suffers from many of the same problems that plague standard-form
contracts. Namely, a settings-based contract does not encourage con-
sumers to read the terms of the contract, and it does not truly give
consumers any more bargaining power. This problem arises because
consumers do not customize their account settings as part of the con-
tracting process. Instead, users must first create an account-which
requires that they agree to the vendor's terms of use-before they can
access their account settings. 1 25 Moreover, the fact that consumers
can change their terms after accepting the contract further reduces
the need for consumers to read the contract in the first place.
Furthermore, a settings-based contract gives vendors the ability to
add or remove customization options from its customers' account-set-
tings pages. Facebook, for example, has removed a number of cus-
tomization options from its privacy-settings and application-settings
pages.' 26 By retaining the ability to add or remove customization op-
tions, a vendor reduces the extent to which its customers can rely on
its contract. This would presumably reduce the amount of additional
consideration that a vendor can extract from its customers in return
for presenting its customers with a customizable contract.
TV
INTERACTIVE CONTRACTS
To resolve the issues described above, I suggest that vendors use
interactive contracts. An interactive contract takes the form of a stan-
dard-form contract except that, for certain parts of the contract, a
user can select between several different clauses, each of which has
been predrafted by the vendor. This Part begins by describing the
process of drafting and executing an interactive contract and then
124 Transferring data over the Internet requires bandwidth, which costs money. See,
e.g., Joseph Scott, How Much Does One Terabyte of Bandwidth Cost?, JOSEPH ScoTr (Jan. 22,
2009), http://josephscott.org/archives/2O09/01/how-much-does-one-terabyte-of-band
width-cost/ (surveying the cost of transferring one terabyte of bandwidth per month).
125 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
126 See Dig into the Details, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/details/ (last
visited Aug. 8, 2012).
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compares the interactive contract to the settings-based contract and
typical standard-form contract. Finally, this Part examines some of the
costs and problems associated with interactive contracts.
A. The Interactive-Contracting Process
At the drafting stage, a vendor must first determine which terms
it wants to make customizable. A website-hosting company might, for
example, want to let consumers specify what operating system they
want their websites hosted on, where they want the company to store
their data, and what security provisions they want to apply to their
data. The vendor may then decide whether to make such customiza-
tion free for the consumer or to extract some additional considera-
tion. For example, a vendor might decide to allow consumers to
select a different venue in a choice-of-venue clause but to require that
the consumer pay an additional amount or consent to a shorter war-
ranty period. The vendor then needs to decide what its "default"
should be for each of the customizable terms in case a consumer does
not select a term. After making these decisions, a vendor must draft
each of these terms and decide on a way to present these terms to
consumers in a way that invites consumer interaction.
The way in which a vendor presents these customizable terms will
likely affect how consumers (and courts) treat the contract. A vendor
might choose to place all the customizable terms at the beginning of
the contract to maximize user interaction, similar to the way social
networks place customizable terms in a user-settings page. Such an
approach would not encourage consumers to read the rest of the con-
tract, however. As a result, this approach would likely subject the in-
teractive contract to the same judicial criticism suffered by typical
standard-form contracts.
Alternatively, a vendor could place the customizable terms in the
body of the contract. For example, the "litigation" section of the con-
tract could present a choice-of-venue clause that would allow consum-
ers to select between several venues. This approach would encourage
consumers to read the entire contract, but it may result in consumers
simply ignoring the customizable terms if the entire contract is too
long or confusing. A middle-ground approach would be to place the
customizable terms within the body of the contract but to create a
separate "summary of customizable terms" that links consumers to the
parts of the contract containing the customizable terms. Presumably,
the second approach would be ideal for short and simple contracts
while the middle-ground approach would be ideal for longer
contracts.
When a consumer wants to purchase a product from a vendor,
the vendor will present the consumer with its interactive contract and
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alert the consumer that some of the terms are customizable. At this
point, each of the customizable terms will be set to the vendor's de-
fault option. The consumer, however, can click on any of the default
options and select one of the vendor's other pre-drafted options. Us-
ing the choice-of-venue example, the default term might read, "All
disputes shall be resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction in the
State of [New York]." The consumer could then click on the New
York text (which would create a pull-down menu) and then select
"[New Jersey]". If the vendor wants to extract additional considera-
tion from this choice, the vendor would place that additional consid-
eration next to the "New Jersey" option. After the consumer finishes
customizing the contract, the consumer would click the "I accept" but-
ton. At this point, the terms of the contract would become fixed and
neither party could modify them unless the contract indicates
otherwise.
B. Comparing Interactive Contracts to Standard-Form Contracts
and Settings-Based Contracts
Unlike a settings-based contract, an interactive contract invites in-
put from consumers throughout the contracting process. Moreover,
because the terms of an interactive contract are fixed once the con-
sumer clicks "I accept," both consumers and vendors can better rely
on the contract. As a result, vendors can use interactive contracts in
many situations to avoid the limitations that relate to settings-based
contracts and to help alleviate some of the problems that standard-
form contracts face.
Both interactive contracts and settings-based contracts (together,
"flexible contracts") retain the same scales of economy as typical stan-
dard-form contracts. Like standard-form contracts, flexible contracts
do not involve an actual bargaining process between the vendor and
each of its consumers. To be sure, flexible contracts are likely more
expensive to prepare than standard-form contracts. However, as with
a standard-form contract, a vendor need only prepare a flexible con-
tract once; afterward, the vendor can use the contract as many times
as it wants.
Moreover, the use of a flexible contract allows both vendors and
consumers to avoid some of the efficiency losses that result when a
consumer is willing to pay more for a specific contractual term but is
unable to do so due to the lack of a negotiation process. With an
interactive contract, a vendor can bundle terms that are more desira-
ble to consumers with either a monetary fee or some other term that
may be more desirable to the vendor.
As compared to both standard-form and settings-based contracts,
interactive contracts may provide consumers with a greater incentive
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to actually read the contract. Some users may not bother to read stan-
dard-form contracts because they know that, even if they disagree with
some of the terms of the contract, they are not able to vary or remove
those terms.1 27 As discussed in Part III, settings-based contracts do
not address this concern. Interactive contracts, however, alleviate this
problem by giving users some control over the terms of the contract
that they accept, and, importantly, the users only retain this control
prior to accepting the contract.
In light of the above, courts should be more willing to enforce
interactive contracts than standard-form, or even settings-based, con-
tracts. Based on the language in Specht, a user's act of selecting a par-
ticular provision would likely constitute an "unambiguous
manifestation of assent,"' 28 at least with respect to that provision. Ar-
guably, the act of selecting a particular contractual provision and then
clicking an "I accept" button constitutes a greater act of assent than
merely clicking an "I accept" button.
This is not to say that interactive contracts are categorically supe-
rior to settings-based contracts. A settings-based contract is likely su-
perior in situations in which a vendor wants to give consumers the
chance to change terms frequently and to preserve its right to control
the terms that its consumers can customize. Nevertheless, a vendor
can use interactive contracts in many contexts where a settings-based
contract would otherwise be inapt.
C. Potential Barriers to Interactive Contracting
Perhaps the most significant barrier to implementing interactive
contracts is that these contracts will be more expensive to draft. Attor-
neys must consider all the different variations in provisions and how
these provisions will interact with each other when combined in vari-
ous ways. While the cost of preparing an interactive contract will only
be a one-time expenditure, this initial expense may still present a sig-
nificant barrier to implementation.
This increase in cost may also act as an effective and beneficial
check against vendors making their contracts too interactive. While
consumers may benefit from having the ability to customize parts of
their contracts, one can easily conceive of a contract that contains so
many variations that consumers become overwhelmed by choice.
Such a contract would likely be prohibitively expensive to prepare,
while a contract that offers only one or two customizable terms should
be comparatively cheap.
127 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 432-33.
128 Cf Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
that clicking a "download" button does not manifest assent to contract terms where the
offeror has not made clear that clicking the "download" button signifies assent).
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Another potential problem with interactive contracting is that all
of the benefits of interactivity depend upon consumers actually inter-
acting with the contract and choosing between terms. The extent of
this problem will depend to a large extent on how a vendor presents
the customizable terms. A vendor can maximize the chance of inter-
action by placing all of its customizable terms in a separate, promi-
nent location. However, such a placement would disincentivize
consumers from reading the rest of the contract. This disincentive, in
turn, might undermine the enforceability of the contract. On the
other hand, a vendor can incentivize consumers to read the entire
contract by placing its customizable terms within the body of the con-
tract. This approach, of course, would reduce the likelihood that con-
sumers will interact with those terms.
Another factor that may influence the degree to which consum-
ers interact with a vendor's contract is the degree to which a vendor's
consumers interact with each other. Social networks, for example, al-
low users to easily communicate with each other. Thus, the few users
who bother to read their terms of service can easily contact their
friends to express their thoughts about the terms. 129 These friends, in
turn, may then be interested enough to actually look at the terms.
130
Other vendors can foster interaction between their consumers by
placing community forums on their websites to allow users to interact
with each other. Many retail websites already provide such a service,
albeit for product reviews. 13 '
CONCLUSION
With modern Internet technology, vendors today can now re-
place the aging standard-form contract with a more robust, user-cus-
tomizable contract. Social networks have already seized upon this
technology to design standard-form contracts that incorporate ac-
count-settings pages, thereby giving users some measure of control
over the terms of these contracts. 132 Settings-based contracts can be
difficult to implement in other industries, however, as they require
that the vendor maintain some sort of ongoing relationship with the
consumer. Without such a relationship, consumers do not have an
129 There are several examples of this phenomena occurring. See, e.g., People Against the
New Terms of Service (TOS), FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=7706910
7432 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (log in with a Facebook account).
130 See Danah Boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, 15 Fiesr
MONDAY (Aug. 2, 2010), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/
article/view/3086/2589.
131 See, e.g., Customer Reviews of Spore, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Spore-Mac/
product-reviews/BOOOFKBCX4 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (displaying users' comments
about the simulation game Spore).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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account-settings page through which they can control the terms of
their contracts.
Moreover, settings-based contracts may give vendors and consum-
ers too much flexibility. These contracts typically give vendors discre-
tion to add or remove customization options from their customers'
account-settings pages, thereby reducing the extent to which their cus-
tomers can rely on the contract. On the other hand, consumers are
free to adjust their account settings on a whim, and a vendor may find
itself struggling to continually accommodate each users' change in
preferences.
The same technology that social networks employ to create set-
tings-based contracts can be modified to create interactive contracts.
Unlike a settings-based contract, an interactive contract invites feed-
back from consumers during the contracting process. Both vendors
and consumers can benefit from this form of contracting. Vendors
benefit because interactive contracts may be more likely to withstand
judicial scrutiny than standard-form or settings-based contracts. Inter-
active contracting also allows vendors to extract additional considera-
tion from consumers who may be willing to pay a premium for certain
terms. On the other end, consumers benefit from interactive con-
tracting because they have more control over the terms of their con-
tracts. While the classic bargained-for contract still remains largely
impractical in the online mass-consumer culture, interactive con-
tracting brings both vendors and consumers one step closer to a vir-
tual bargaining table.
1556 [Vol. 97:1533
